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Strong militias, weak states and armed violence. 




This study challenges the well-established in conflict studies presentation of paramilitary 
organisations as state-manipulated death-squads or self-defence groups, and argues that 
some of present-day militias extend their functions well beyond the role of shadowy pro-
regime enforcers. Drawing its empirical insights from Ukrainian pro-government Volunteer 
Battalions and supporting these findings with empirical observations from other parts of the 
world, this article posits that the rise of powerful militia organisations, acting in parallel to the 
state, makes it imperative to revisit the theory and typology of paramilitary violence. The key 
theoretical argument of this study is that “state-parallel” militias differ qualitatively from 
“state-manipulated” paramilitaries typical of the Cold War period. It is detailed in this article 
that although “state-parallel” paramilitaries are not a new phenomenon, they have thus far 
remained critically understudied and under-theorised. 
 
In 2014, the lightning advance of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has 
brought under control of the self-proclaimed caliphate vast swathes of Iraqi territory, 
leaving Iraqi security forces rooted out and paralysed. Yet, a force capable of standing up 
to the Islamists’ advance has soon emerged in the face of powerful, well-trained and highly 
motivated Shia militias, known as Volunteer Fighters (al-Hashed al-Sha’bi). Much in 
contrast to poorly-organised and lightly-armed Shia militias of the US-occupation period, 
the new extra-state Shia militias present a formidable force, which has managed to not only 
halt the ISIL’s advance on Baghdad, but also to claw back some territory from ISIL. While 
the Iraqi government openly began to employ rogue, yet efficient, Shia militias in its 
desperate fight to stop the ISIL’s offensive, the collapse of Yemeni’s government of Ali 
Abdullah Saleh under the onslaught of Houthi rebels marked the emergence of another 
shadowy and uncontrolled paramilitary force: Sunni Popular Committees. As official 
Yemeni armed forces almost ceased to function, the pro-government Popular Committees, 
currently entrenched in Sunni regions of the country, represent the only force capable of 
exercising the elected president’s monopoly on the use of violence.  
Both Iraqi Shia battalions and Yemeni Sunni Popular Committees are the 
representatives of a relatively under-researched category of pro-government 
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paramilitaries,1 termed in this study as “state-parallel” militias. On the one hand, these 
groups’ intimate association with the regime, engendered in their struggle to preserve the 
state and to secure it from falling into the hands of rebels, places state-parallel militias into 
the category of typical pro-government paramilitaries. On the other hand, their supremacy 
– either military or structural – over conventional armed forces, their financial and 
structural independence from the regime, as well as their indispensability for the survival 
of the state elevate these groups in parallel to the state and place them beyond state’s 
control. These intrinsic characteristics contrast state-parallel paramilitaries with classical 
“state-manipulated” paramilitaries, such as self-defence and death-squads, which, during 
the Cold War were commonly employed by governments around the world. This 
observation lies at the heart of the theoretical claim of this study, which posits that the 
existing literature on paramilitary violence fails to distinguish state-parallel paramilitaries 
from the “mainstream” types of paramilitary organisations. As seen from recent examples 
around the world, state-parallel paramilitaries are becoming as common as the state-
manipulated groups.  Nevertheless, this type of militias has been generally under-theorized 
and over-determined in their relationship to the state. This article demonstrates that 
sovereignty of pro-state armed groups might be operating in a more horizontal manner than 
it is often assumed. Disaggregating paramilitaries into “ideal-types” of “state-manipulated” 
and “state-parallel” categories is, therefore, enables to expand our understanding of 
paramilitary organisations and their role in contemporary armed conflicts.  
Empirically, among all other state-parallel paramilitaries, some of which will be 
discussed more in detail in later parts of this article, this study is focused on one of the least 
researched paramilitary organisations, Ukraine’s pro-government Volunteer Battalions 
(volontery). As will be shown in the empirical sections of this study, volontery serves as an 
excellent example of a “state-parallel” militias, which, despite their close association with 
the regime in Kiev, are fiercely independent and grow increasingly critical and 
                                                          
1 This article borrows its definition of pro-government militias (or paramilitaries) from 
Carey et al. (2013: 250), who identify as militias any group (1) defined as pro-government or 
sponsored by the state; (2) functioning outside regular security structures; (3) armed, and (4) 
organised.  
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disillusioned of President Petro Poroshenko’s government. The key empirical objective of 
this study is to demonstrate how Ukraine’s volontery differ from state-manipulated 
paramilitaries and why this recently emerged paramilitary force can serve as an illustrative 
example of state-parallel paramilitaries.      
 
Paramilitary typology revisited  
 
Although paramilitaries existed since antiquity, it is only during the past several 
decades that the phenomenon of extra-state or sub-state pro-regime actors involved in civil 
wars against anti-government rebels has become an inextricable part of research in political 
violence (Kalyvas, 2006). Termed as death-squads, (civilian) self-defence groups, 
vigilantes or civilian guards, pro-government extra-state actors have been recorded as part 
of virtually each protracted armed conflict since the start of the Cold War (Carey et al., 
2015). For example, as estimated by Oppenheim et al. (2015: 2), pro-government 
paramilitaries have been deployed in two-thirds of irregular wars since 1989.  
Much of research on paramilitary groups has evolved from the “New Wars” thesis 
(Kaldor, 2013) and the ensuing argument that armed conflicts can no longer be understood 
in terms of “master cleavages” (Kalyvas, 2003). While the proponents of “New Wars” 
theory argued that the proliferation of pro-government armed groups is a new phenomenon, 
their critiques insisted that it is major historical shifts that affected the types of actors in 
present-day civil wars (Henderson and Singer, 2000; Newman, 2004; Duyvesteyn and 
Angstrom, 2005). In the wake of “War on Terror,” research on paramilitaries experienced 
decline, but a renewed interest to para-state groups has been sparked by the post-“Arab 
Spring” conflicts. 
The existing literature on paramilitaries is rife with numerous empirical studies 
either exploring selected paramilitary organisations, or conducting paired comparisons 
(Campbell and Brenner, 2000; Mazzei, 2009; Ahram, 2011). A large and growing body of 
literature on militias, consists of studies on militia-government relations (Staniland, 2015; 
Carey et al., 2015), militias’ role in genocide (Pilster et al., 2014; Ahram, 2015), civilian 
victimization (Stanton, 2015), sexual violence (Cohen and Nordås, 2015), mass killings 
(Koren, 2015), and human rights violations (Mitchell et al., 2014).  
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In spite of the diversity of empirical literature on paramilitaries, few attempts were 
thus far made to classify militias. To date the first and the only effort to typologise militias 
was made by Carey et al. (2013), who suggested distinguishing between “informal” and 
“semi-official” paramilitaries. In accordance with the typology, informal militias are 
“armed, supported by or act on the side of the government and are described as pro-
government, government militia, linked to the government, government-backed, or 
government-allied” (2013: 251). By contrast, semi-official paramilitaries have “recognized 
legal or semiofficial status, in contrast to the looser affiliation of informal PGMs” (2013: 
251). As useful as it is, this typology is first of all aimed at controlling for militias’ 
association with government and offers limited insights into organisational and operational 
characteristics of paramilitary organisations, or in their broader relationship with the state. 
While both the Colombia’s AUC and Sudanese Janjaweed fall into the category of informal 
militias, their capacity and strength vis-à-vis the state differ vastly. In the same vein, many 
semiofficial groups, including Iraqi Shia battalions and the Philippines’ CAFGU, not only 
have fundamentally different relationship with the state, but are also pursuing different 
goals.   
This raises a number of fundamental and unexplored theory-related questions. Can 
all contemporary militias be lumped together under one overarching definition of 
paramilitary organisations? Are all of these groups, whether described as self-defence or 
death-squads, similarly organised? Do they perform identical functions and share similar 
(or at least comparable) characteristics? The existing theories of paramilitary violence–
along with the above militia typologies–offer limited explanation of the diversity of 
paramilitary groups and, most importantly, fail to explain what makes some militias more 
powerful, influential and military-capable than others. 
This article argues that the plurality of paramilitary organisations in recent history 
falls into two generic, yet inherently distinct, categories of “state-manipulated” and “state-
parallel” paramilitaries. The former category includes the majority of typical self-defence 
units, death squads and pro-regime “enforcers,” which dominated civil wars and irregular 
conflicts from the start of Cold War era until the late 1990s. The latter group covers 
paramilitary organisations, less common prior to the turn of this century, yet more 
widespread and influential today. These groups include, but not limited to, popular 
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mobilisation forces, offensive sub-state counterinsurgents and tribal or traditional militias. 
This article suggests that although state-manipulated militias have been featured 
prominently in the existing theory of paramilitary violence, it is the state-parallel groups 
that have thus far remained unnoticed and under-theorised.  
 
From “state-manipulated” to “state-parallel” paramilitaries  
     
For decades, hundreds of similarly-structured state-controlled paramilitary 
organisations existed not only across Latin America, but also in Europe, Africa, Asia, and 
the Middle East. The key cause behind the appearance of these paramilitary groups was 
what Campbell and Brenner (2000: 16-17) describe as the state’s efforts to “subcontract” 
its monopoly on the use of violence to extra-state agents, who, with the state’s covert 
blessing and support, would do the state’s “dirty jobs” of violently eliminating the anti-
regime opposition. The use of paramilitaries has not only been practiced by undemocratic 
(or with poor democracy record) Third World regimes, but also by the great powers, such 
as the United States during the so-called “Banana Wars” in Latin America. Pro-incumbent 
paramilitaries were widely deployed in French and American wars in Vietnam, British 
counterinsurgency in Malaya and the Northern Ireland, as well as the Soviet 
counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (Nagl, 2002; Dixon, 2009). 
The rise and spread of state-manipulated militias is closely associated with the 
development of human rights discourse and increasing international pressure on 
developing states to adhere to international human rights standards (Huggins, 1991: 11). 
As human rights issues often become interconnected with economic aid, foreign trade and 
international assistance, legalising and “humanising” their counterinsurgency methods has 
become an issue of significant concern not only for undemocratic Third World regimes, 
but also for established democracies. Since most state-manipulated militias officially 
remain outside of state’s legal jurisdiction, their actions cannot be blamed on the state. It 
was, therefore, critical for the state to conceal its links with state-manipulated groups. 
While some governments had done a superb job of hiding their connections with militias, 
others have systemically failed to distance themselves from paramilitaries (Grajales, 2011). 
For example, although Northern Ireland’s Loyalist paramilitaries were represented in the 
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Northern Ireland Assembly, for instance within the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP), none 
of the Loyalist groups had official affiliation either with political parties or with elected 
and appointed officials (McAuley, 2004).   
The ability of the state to mask its association with paramilitaries has become critical 
for the assessment as to how much control the state has over militias. Undoubtedly, the 
scope and the nature of the governments’ desired, perceived and actual manipulation over 
paramilitaries differs in each case. Some militias dodge government manipulation and 
manage to preserve various degrees of autonomy from the state. Nonetheless, even for 
those state-manipulated militias which alleged their independence, the regime’s support 
and approval were critical for their survival. One of the main definitive characteristics of 
state-manipulated groups is that such organisations are not only founded by the regime or 
associated with the regime’s elites, but are also financed by the state (Forero, 2007). 
Although some state-manipulated militias enjoy open support of the state (Van Bruinessen, 
1996), most – due to the nature of their activities– have no formal connections to the state. 
These groups are funded by the regime informally and covertly.  
State manipulation of militias, however, is not limited to financial and material 
assistance. Having created militias and secretly allocated them some of its monopoly over 
the use of violence, the state seeks to ensure that paramilitaries not only remain under its 
firm (or relative) control, but also that militias do not grow excessively powerful or 
independent. For example, bloody infighting among Irish Loyalist paramilitaries – 
allegedly fuelled by the Loyalists’ supporters from within the government –left deep 
cleavages among the Loyalist organisations and remained a source of the Loyalist 
paramilitaries’ weakness and their inability to threaten the state (Gallaher and Shirlow, 
2006).  
The auxiliary role of state-manipulated militias remained obvious in almost each 
conflict where they were deployed. Mazzei (2009: 6) conclusively observed that “in 
countries with paramilitaries, there is also a strong and active military.” Despite being 
employed as important and even the most efficient counterinsurgent, as was the case with 
pro-Russian Chechen paramilitaries Kadyrovtsy, state-manipulated groups were always 
deployed alongside the army and not instead of it. While militias were widely used to 
perform an array of “dirty jobs” for official security services, which include, but not limited 
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to, targeted assassinations, torture, extrajudicial executions and kidnappings, they are far 
from having either the resources or firepower of the army. Since their spread, state-
manipulated militias performed tasks of both offensive counterinsurgents and of secret 
death-squads. In contrast to civilian defence militias, whose duties are thought to be limited 
to defensive functions (Clayton and Thomson, 2014), state-manipulated paramilitaries 
have evolved by imitating and adapting insurgents’ tactics of “hit-and-run”, mercilessly 
persecuting civilians suspected of association with rebels and relying on all available 
means of destroying the enemy. Most of the above characteristics are commonly shared by 
(or can be observed in) all paramilitary organisations described in this article under the 
term “state-manipulated” groups. The analysis of such organisations has been at the core 
of existing studies on paramilitary violence. The bulk of empirical insights on 
contemporary paramilitary organisations has been drawn almost exclusively from 
paramilitary groups with characteristics similar to the Colombian AUC or the Irish Ulster 
Volunteer Force (UVF). 
There is, however, another type of paramilitaries, which remains beyond both the 
analytical limits and theoretical grasp of the classical theory of paramilitary violence, as 
advocated by Campbell and Brenner (2000), Mazzei (2009), Ahram (2011), and other 
scholars of paramilitary groups (Mitchell et al., 2014; Carey et al., 2015). Dubbed in this 
article as “state-parallel” paramilitaries, these organisations have characteristics directly 
opposite to state-manipulated militias. Their emergence, structure, functions, goals, their 
rise to prominence and demise, all fundamentally differ from their state-manipulated 
counterparts. To start with, one essential precondition for the emergence of state-parallel 
groups is the weakness of the state. In most cases of state-parallel militias’ appearance, the 
state’s ability to exercise effective control over its territory and subjects had been severely 
impaired. As the mobilisation of state-parallel militias occurs in a condition of either 
complete dissolution of formal security services and the army, or under their inherent 
weakness, the state is close to losing both its monopoly on the use of violence (to rebels) 
and its control over its physical territory. Although the incremental weakness and 
incapacitation of the state are among the key pre-conditions for the rise of state-parallel 
paramilitaries, the state does not necessary have to “fail”. From Sierra Leone and Georgia 
to Sudan, Ukraine and Iraq, state-parallel militias have preyed on the weakness of the state. 
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The state, however, remained fully functional and was far from being on the verge of 
collapse. In each of these cases, however, the state had low military capacity to resist 
insurgents. Houthis in Yemen, ISIL in Iraq, Abkhaz rebels in Georgia, as well as many 
other opponents of state-parallel militias, were far too strong for the conventional armed 
forces. Unlike Chechen rebels during the Second Chechen War, who posed no existential 
threat to the Russian state and, who could be entrusted to the state-manipulated Kadyrovtsy 
(Souleimanov and Aliyev, 2014), rebel groups faced by the state-parallel militias present a 
direct challenge to the regime. However, the existence of a functioning state is not vital for 
the emergence of state-parallel militias. As examples of Somali and Rwanda have shown, 
paramilitaries rise to prominence as long as there is a regime – even a failed one – that 
claims to represent the state.  
While state weakness is the first quintessential condition for the emergence of state-
parallel militias, armed conflict is the other factor accounting for the rise of paramilitaries. 
State-parallel militias emerge due to crisis and due to the government’s inability to deal 
with the challenge to state authority posed by rebels. Few, if any, state-parallel groups 
existed before the start of conflicts in their original form and capacity. Both Sudanese 
Janjaweed and Sierra Leone’s Kamajors, which prior to conflicts functioned as traditional 
tribal militias, were re-created and re-directed to fight against the regime’s enemies. Since 
most state-parallel militias are mobilised in the midst of a conflict, few of these groups 
survive either the end of civil war or the increase of state’s power. Congolese Cobras and 
Ninjas, Georgian Mkhedrioni, Serb volunteers, as well as other state-parallel militias in 
post-conflict countries became redundant and were demobilised. 
As long as there is armed conflict and the government is weak, state-parallel groups 
tend to thrive and increase their power vis-a-vis the state. Preservation of the state, or of 
ruling elites, and the opposition to rebels are the key priorities of state-parallel militias. As 
long as state interests relate to militias’ goals, paramilitaries avoid challenging or replacing 
the government. Main objectives of paramilitary leaders are not the regime change or 
transformation, but the conservation of status quo on behalf of the government. Survival 
of the state is pursued by state-parallel militias at any cost, including by resorting on 
extreme forms of violence, such as genocide (Ahram, 2015) and large-scale human rights 
violations (Mitchell et al., 2014). Whereas government may choose to refrain from 
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persecuting its own citizens for the sake of remaining in power, state-parallel militias 
would eagerly and violently supress all forms of dissent in order to safeguard the state from 
collapse. Although interests of militias are closely aligned with those of governments, 
state-parallel paramilitaries may disregard the government, or function as parallel 
institutions, as seen from the example of numerous Libyan militias backing either an 
internationally-recognised government in Tobruk or its Tripoli-based rivals.  
Often, the occurrence and trajectory of state-parallel paramilitaries is embedded in 
long-standing local traditions of irregular violence and militia organisation. In post-
communist countries, the tradition of the “second line of defence” is both engraved in 
history of irregular units (Cossacks, Hajduks, etc.) and sustained by the communist-era 
para-state militia formations (Gilley, 2015), present in most Eastern Bloc countries. Similar 
traditions flourished in Sudan (Ahram, 2011), Sierra Leone (Murphy, 2003), Arab 
countries (Schiller, 1987), as well as in East Asia (Marten, 2007).  
Having stipulated that state-parallel paramilitaries are fundamentally different from 
state-manipulated militias, this study identifies three major characteristics which 
distinguish state-parallel paramilitaries from their state-manipulated counterparts. Firstly, 
state-parallel militias possess military strength that is both essential and crucial for the 
survival of the regime. A key characteristic of state-parallel paramilitaries is their 
superiority – either military or organisational – over conventional military forces and their 
preparedness to fight anti-regime rebels when the army is unable to do so. Unlike state-
manipulated groups, which are employed to tackle insurgencies alongside, but not instead 
of the conventional army, and are used solely because of their specific qualities (i.e. 
familiarity with insurgents), but can be easily replaced by or merged with official security 
forces, state-parallel militias thrive because they are irreplaceable by the army. Instead of 
operating as auxiliary or self-defence forces, performing “dirty jobs” for the army, such as 
serving as death-squads, state-parallel militias function as key counterinsurgency forces. It 
is the state-parallel militias’ capacity to replace, or substitute, the state as the principal 
counterinsurgent that elevates them above state-manipulated groups. Their superior 
military power, high individual motivation of their fighters and their material resources 
make them the best (or the only) available alternative to conventional armed forces. For 
example, Iraqi Shiite volunteer forces are estimated to number around 90,000 men and the 
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total number of Shiite volunteers engaged in the fight against ISIL has reached one million 
fighters in 2014 (Sarhan, 2014). By contrast, Iraqi armed forces consist of less than 100,000 
frontline troops infamous for their low morale and poor organisation. It must be noted that 
the level of resource access differs from one militia group to another and some 
paramilitaries might have forces and weaponry superior to the army, while others may lack 
military hardware of modern armies, but substitute it with superior organisation, structure 
and tactics. 
Bearing in mind that it is mostly in times of crisis and moments critical for the 
survival of the regime that state-parallel militias emerge and thrive, the regime has few 
other options but to rely on state-parallel paramilitaries for many counterinsurgency tasks. 
In such situations, the state unwillingly parts with its monopoly on the use of violence in 
exchange for a guarantee of survival. It is not uncommon for members of state-parallel 
groups to fight alongside the conventional army, for instance, as in the case of Ukraine’s 
volontery. Yet, having witnessed weaknesses and poor preparedness of the army, it is 
unusual for state-parallel militia members to leave their organisations in order to join the 
formal security forces (Ron, 2000). Despite frequent claims by state officials about 
integrating state-parallel paramilitaries into official security forces, successful cases of 
incorporating paramilitaries into the army are few and far between (Reeves, 2014).        
Secondly, state-parallel militias boast political representation in state’s institutions 
and also often function within legal framework. Rather than being shadowy death-squads, 
state-parallel groups openly participate in the political life of the state. With their leaders 
represented in legislative or, less often executive, branches of the government, state-
parallel militias may have legal status and their activity might even be based on official 
decrees. For example, Iraqi al-Hashed al-Sha’bi battalions were officially formed by the 
Ministry of Interior and are subject to legal frameworks and practices pertaining to official 
security forces. In reality, however, the inception of the powerful Shia paramilitary force 
occurred after the call by the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, known as “righteous jihad 
fatwah” (al-Kadhimi, 2015). The plurality of Shia battalions remains outside Baghdad’s 
direct control (Mamouri, 2015). Their leaders, however, have close ties to the political 
establishment. For instance, both of Shia militia’s senior leaders – Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis 
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(former MP for Babil Governorate) and Hadi al-Ameri (former Minister of Transportation) 
– previously occupied top positions within the Iraqi government.  
What distinguishes state-parallel militias from state-controlled security forces, 
including state-operated militia, is that paramilitaries are not directly accountable to the 
government. Some of these groups might pledge loyalty to an external (regime supporter) 
actor, such as many of Iraq’s Shia battalions loyal to Iran or some of Yemen’s pro-regime 
militias accountable to Saudi Arabia. Others are loyal to domestic power-brokers, such as 
Muqtada al-Sadr’s militias in Iraq. The pattern that can be observed with a degree of 
consistency across the majority of state-parallel militias is that, even though these groups 
might be receiving some military hardware and financing from the state, they procure the 
bulk of their funding, recruitment and supply from sources other than the state budget. 
Functioning as a state within a state, state-parallel militias do not depend exclusively either 
on state-provided arms or on regime’s funding. Unlike many state-manipulated groups, 
such as Colombia’s AUC or Northern Ireland’s UVF (Silke, 1998), state-parallel militias 
are careful to avoid drawing their funding from criminal activities and seek to distance 
themselves from criminal groups. The state-parallel militias’ rejection of engaging into 
criminal activities takes us to the next characteristic intrinsic to such organisations.    
Efforts to legitimise themselves among the population are an inextricable part of the 
state-parallel militias’ agenda. Along with representation among and support from the 
regime’s elites, state-parallel paramilitaries seek legitimacy and acceptance among the 
population, which they claim to protect and represent. Instead of limiting their immediate 
objectives to “defending” selected communities or groups of individuals, as it is often the 
case with state-manipulated groups, state-parallel paramilitaries struggle to represent 
broader national interests and claim to protect the state, or the nation, as such (Murphy, 
2003). Although in practice state-parallel militias emerge defending ethnic or sectarian 
interests of certain parts of the population, such as Shia al-Hashed al-Sha’bi, Arab 
Janjaweed or Yemeni Sunni Popular Committees, their pro-government stance enables 
them to portray themselves as protectors of national unity and territorial integrity of the 
state. Drawing their recruits and, in some cases, funding from among sympathisers within 
the population, similarly to insurgents, state-parallel militias manage to mobilise mass 
support and to achieve positive recognition. This often remains beyond the organisational 
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limits of state-manipulated death-squads or self-defence groups, whose legitimacy is 
questioned even by the very political elites on whose orders they act.  
Similarly to Carey’s et al. (2013) “semi-official” militias, state-parallel 
paramilitaries have a recognised legal status. However, in contrast to semi-official groups, 
governments lack means and resources to either control state-parallel militias or to 
substitute them with regular security forces (2013: 251). While some state-parallel groups 
are institutionalised as “volunteers” (Shia militias and Croatian battalions), others are 
customary, or even tribal forces (Janjaweed and Kamajors). State-parallel militias’ 
affiliation with government does not merely grant them legitimacy, but legalises and 
justifies their “parallel-to-government” position.  
Among the population, state-parallel groups position themselves as guarantors of 
security, stability and justice, performing functions which often remain unattended by weak 
state institutions. While the relationship between state-manipulated militias and the 
population, as detailed in studies on Colombian paramilitaries (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2008), is 
always uneasy and contentious, state-parallel militias seek to advert their organisations as 
grassroots movements embedded in local communities and, therefore, draw their 
legitimacy from collaboration with the population. As opposed to governments, often seen 
as corrupt and impotent, paramilitaries thriving on weak and inefficient system of central 
governance are seen by the population as providers of law and order.  
This is not to say, however, that state-parallel militias do not perpetrate atrocities 
and human rights violations. Not only in the case of Ukraine, but also in many other conflict 
zones with the presence of state-parallel paramilitaries, instances of violence against 
civilians in rebel-controlled areas are widespread (Willgress, 2015). While atrocities 
committed by such state-parallel militias as Rwandan Interahamwe and Sudanese 
Janjaweed are falling under the international definition of genocide (Mitchell et al., 2014; 
Ahram, 2015), war crimes of Serb volunteer battalions during Yugoslav wars are no less 
serious examples of state-parallel paramilitaries’ extreme violence against the civilian 
population. The key characteristic of excessive violence perpetrated by state-parallel 
militias, which distinguishes them from state-manipulated groups, is that state-parallel 
paramilitaries are keen to target en masse groups, or elements of the population, associated 
with rebels.  
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The past several years have witnessed the rise of such powerful and often foreign-
supported insurgent organisations as pro-Russian separatists in East Ukraine, Houthi rebels 
in Yemen and ISIL in Iraq and Syria, which flourish at the expense of state weakness and 
pose a direct existential threat to governments. The emergence of paramilitary 
organisations capable of fighting these rebel armies on behalf of the state, but existing 
parallel to governments and remaining beyond their control, emphasises the growing 
importance of state-parallel militias. Quantitative analysis of the emergence of pro-
government militias from 1970 to 2014 (see APPENDIX), reveals that state-parallel 
militias were almost non-existent prior to 1980, but became more widespread since the 
1990s. Secessionist conflicts in post-communist countries and ethnic civil wars in Africa, 
as well as more recent religious and sectarian conflicts in Middle East, have contributed to 
state weakness and given rise to numerous state-parallel paramilitary organisations. In the 
early 2000s, there was also a peak in the emergence of state-manipulated militias. 
However, few new state-manipulated groups appeared over the past decade. Although the 
question as to why state-parallel groups emerge in the first place should constitute a topic 
for future research, most commonly this type of militias appear in response to state 
weakness and rebel strength. Additionally, the political will of domestic and international 
actors, as well as broader political economy of conflicts attribute to the paramilitary 
formation.  
The following sections illustrate an empirical analysis of a state-parallel militia on 
the example of Ukraine’s Volunteer Battalions. Since the phenomenon of state-parallel 
paramilitaries is sensitive to case selection, the choice of Ukraine’s volontery as a single 
case is not unwarranted. Ukraine’s paramilitaries represent all three major characteristics 
of state-parallel groups. They have military strength comparable to a regular army, they 
boast direct representation in the legislative branch and they seek popular legitimisation. 
This makes volontery similar to Iraqi al-Sha’bi, Sudanese Janjaweed, Rwandan 
Interahamwe, Lebanese Hezbollah and Libyan state-parallel armed organizations, but 
qualitatively different from, for example, Syrian Shabiha, or the Colombian AUC. 
Research on volontery began emerging only recently and existing studies – in line with this 
theory of state-parallel militias – put weight on historical and contextual causes of the 
paramilitary’s emergence (Schnekener, 2014; Gilley, 2015).       
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Methods and data 
 
The empirical analysis focuses on the armed conflict in Ukraine’s eastern region of 
Donbas from the onset of conflict in April 2014 to the Minsk ceasefire agreement of 
September 2014. This study relies on in-depth qualitative open-ended interviews 
conducted by the author during the summer of 2015 in Ukraine’s capital Kiev. Informants 
included former and current members of volunteer battalions, as well as former members 
of various informal groups incorporated into these paramilitary organizations, such as 
“Maidan Self-Defence” units. A total of 19 paramilitary informants, as well as six members 
of self-defence units, were interviewed on the condition of anonymity. The empirical goal 
of this study was not to obtain a representative sample of a selected group of informants, 
but to gather insider opinions and views of conflict participants in order to supplement the 
data from open sources with field observations. All interviewees were randomly selected 
in accordance with their experience within their respective organisations. Their contact 
details were obtained through volunteer support civil groups based in Kiev and 
Dnepropetrovsk. The selection criteria stipulated that each informant was a member of 
paramilitary groups for at least 60 days. Efforts were made to include opinions of at least 
four (4) unrelated to each other representatives of all major volunteer battalions. Each in-
depth interview (conducted either in Russian or Ukrainian languages) was unstructured and 
lasted between 40 and 80 minutes. In addition, several dozen elite interviews were 
conducted with representatives of Ukrainian civil society (14), executive and legislative 
government (12) and mass media (6) in order to place paramilitary interviews in broader 
socio-political context.  
 
The Rise of a Volunteer Army: From Battlefields of Euromaidan to Donbas 
       
The emergence of Ukraine’s Volunteer Battalions is closely associated with the 
February 2014 overthrow of Viktor Yanukovich’s regime as a result of massive anti-
government protests, termed as “Euromaidan”. The four-month long standoff between 
protesters and the riot police ended violently after the President ordered the use of live 
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ammunition, which led to the death of over 70 protesters and resulted in Yanukovich’s 
escape from the country. As leaders of Euromaidan were building a new governing 
coalition in Kiev, pro-Russian demonstrations began intensifying in Ukraine’s eastern 
Russian-speaking region of Donbas. Following the March 2014 annexation of Crimea by 
the Russian Federation, pro-Russian protesters – armed and organised by Russian security 
services – in early April began the takeover of government buildings across eastern Donbas 
region. On  April 13, Kiev announced the start of “anti-terrorist operation” (ATO) aimed 
at restoring the law and order in separatist held areas of major cities of Donbas region – 
Donetsk and Lugansk – as well as in adjacent districts. Yet, the deployment of Ukrainian 
conscript-based regular Army in the East was disastrous; while some Army units 
voluntarily joined rebels, others were disarmed and disbanded by the insurgents with little 
resistance (Kyiv Post, 2014). By the end of April, pro-Russian separatists announced the 
creation of two independent republics on the territory of Eastern Ukraine – Donetsk 
People’s Republic (DPR) and Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR). The start of Ukrainian 
military offensive, the ATO, was marked by a series of debacles experienced by Ukrainian 
security forces, followed by the expansion of separatist control over areas surrounding the 
DPR and LPR and Ukraine’s loss of control over Russian-Ukrainian border.  
The failure of Ukrainian armed forces to defeat the insurgency was not unexpected. 
As detailed by Kuzio (2000), inherited from the USSR, Ukraine’s massive armed forces, 
which numbered 750,000 in 2000, saw little effective reform since the country’s 
independence. By the start of ATO in April 2014, Ukraine’s army consisted of roughly 
130,000 personnel, of whom fewer than 6,000 men were ready to be deployed in action. 
With the start of armed conflict, due to draft evasion, which was recorded at its highest 
level, corruption and embezzlement in the army, numbers of those turning up voluntarily 
for military service have fallen sharply.  
The official presidential decree to create paramilitary formations in support of the 
army and the National Guard was been issued as early as in March 2014 (Ministry of 
Defense of Ukraine, 2014). Although the establishment of the so-called “territorial defence 
battalions” (Batal`ony Territorial`noi Oborony - Батальйо́ни територіа́льної оборо́ни) 
has started in earnest from early April 2014, it is not until the threat of separatist takeover 
of the key Black Sea port city of Mariupol and separatists’ lighting advance all over the 
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eastern Donbas region that the inflow of volunteers gave birth to Ukraine’s paramilitary 
force volontery (volunteers). The first wave of volunteers to join the battalions consisted 
of members of the so-called “Maidan Self-Defence” (Samooborona) units, which were 
formed during anti Euromaidan protests to protect peaceful protesters from pro-
government enforcers and the riot police. By the end of Euromaidan in February 2014, the 
“Maidan Self-Defence” units were estimated to number up to 12,000 members 
(Ukrainskaya Pravda, 2014a). In the words of the founder and former commander of 
“Aidar” battalion, Serhiy Melnichuk, at the time when his battalion was created, all 250 of 
its members were from Euromaidan self-defence groups and due to their experience in 
street-to-street battles with the police, they “didn’t need military training.”2 A handful of 
individuals enlisted in “Maidan Self-Defence” units were veterans of the Afghan War 
(1979-89) and some of the members of ultra-nationalist “Right Sector” had combat 
experience obtained while fighting alongside Chechen nationalist rebels during the First 
Chechen War.3 However, the vast majority of members of “Maidan Self-Defence” units – 
which formed the core of early volunteer battalions – and those who had joined these 
paramilitary groups at later stages of the conflict in Donbas had no first-hand military 
experience apart from the mandatory service in the Ukrainian army.4 Although many 
volunteer battalions are named after Ukraine’s regions or geographical locales, such as 
Donbas, Aidar or Azov, the battalions have mixed membership with volunteers from all 
over the country, regardless of ethnic or regional origins, joining each of them.   
 
All the King’s Men: Volunteers’ Military Strength 
  
The number of volunteer battalions and their membership began to grow rapidly 
with the start of Ukraine’s offensive in Donbas in July 2014. By the end of July, there were 
already over 30 battalions operating within the zone of ATO. At the time of this writing, 
                                                          
2 Serhiy Melnichuk in his interview to Reuters on July 29, 2015.  
3 Author’s interview with a member of “Donbas” battalion, Kiev, July 14, 2015. 
4 Author’s interview with a former member of “Maidan Self-Defense” unit, Kiev, July 14, 
2015. 
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the number of volunteer battalions has reached 44. Some estimates placed the strength of 
volontery at just over 5,000 men at the start of ATO (Shynkarenko, 2014). In 2015, the 
number of volunteer battalions’ members is assessed to be anywhere between 10,000 and 
30,000 fighters (Kramer, 2014). Bearing in mind that a total number of Ukrainian pro-
government forces currently (as of August 2015) based in the zone of ATO, including 
regular army, the National Guard and paratroopers, stands at approximately 50,000 men, 
volunteer battalions account for more than half of that force. “Azov,” “Donbas,” “Aidar,” 
“Right Sector” and “Dnipro-1” became the most well-known names of volunteer 
battalions. Famous due to their efficiency on the battlefield, their prominent role in 
Ukrainian government offensive in July-August 2014 and their ability to halt separatist 
onslaughts since the September 2014 ceasefire, volunteer battalions’ members acquired 
reputation of Ukraine’s authentic “war heroes” (Hyde, 2014).  
As most combat-fit elements of Ukraine’s military forces, volunteer battalions 
played a critical role in a large-scale government’s offensive on separatists in July-August 
2014. For example, one of the last government successes before the Russian-led separatist 
counter-offensive in August 2014 was the capture of Ilovaisk – which later fell back to 
rebels – executed by four volunteer battalions, spearheaded by “Donbas” battalion. 
Similarly, government’s recapture of the major port city of Mariupol had been advanced 
by the “Azov” battalion. Volunteer battalions’ superiority over the conventional armed 
forces of Ukraine is not only engendered in their numbers and high spirits of their members, 
but also in them being better equipped and paid than the army. In his interview to Reuters 
in March 2015 (Baczynska, 2015), the commander of “Azov” battalion, Andryi Biletsky, 
stated that his paramilitary organisation has heavy artillery and is in a process of creating 
a tank unit. According to a number of government officials, most volunteer battalions 
currently have in their disposal heavy weaponry, including long-range artillery, as well as 
armoured vehicles.5 In comparison to less than US$100 per month salary of a Ukrainian 
army private participating in the ATO, the monthly salary of rank-and-file paramilitary 
fighters is between US$400 (in “Azov”) to US$1,000 (in “Dnipro-1”) (Shynkarenko, 
                                                          
5 Author’s interviews with independent Ukrainian journalists and bloggers, Kiev, July 21, 
2015.  
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2014). Keeping in mind, that Ukraine has one of the highest unemployment rates in the 
former Soviet Union, service in volunteer battalions appears very attractive for many. Not 
surprisingly, as revealed by the leader of “Azov” battalion, the flow of volunteers to his 
battalion consisted of individuals aged between 18 and 62 years old, including homeless 
and pensioners.6 
Volunteer battalions’ military strength is partly derived from their relative financial 
independence from the State. Although Ukraine’s paramilitary battalions are funded 
through a variety of sources, one of the most prominent of these is the covert support of 
battalions by Ukraine’s numerous oligarchs. For example, the volunteer battalion “Dnipro-
1”, based in the eastern city of Dnipropetrovsk, stands out among other paramilitary units 
with primarily grassroots origins in that it was founded and continues to be financed by a 
well-known oligarch and the former governor of Dnipropetrovsk, Igor Kolomoisky. In the 
early days of ATO, while pro-Russian separatists were rapidly advancing towards the 
banks of Dnipr River, Kolomoisky had little hopes in the Ukrainian army’s ability to halt 
the rebel advance on Dnipropetrovsk. According to unofficial estimates (Hirst, 2015), an 
army of 20,000 men armed with heavy weaponry had been amassed and fully funded by 
Kolomoisky during the summer of 2014. Kolomoisky is also known to provide financial 
“patronage” to two other most influential volunteer battalions, “Donbas” and “Azov.”7  
 
Between Trenches and the Parliament: Political Representation  
 
The murky relationship between the country’s oligarchs and paramilitary armies is 
further complicated by the volunteer battalions’ direct association with political elites. 
Rather than operating as shadowy self-defence groups in the spirit of classical SMPs, 
Ukraine’s volunteer battalions enjoy direct representation in the country’s legislative 
branch Verkhovnaia Rada (the Parliament). The scale and scope of the involvement of 
volunteer battalions’ leadership in post-Euromaidan political life is impressive. For 
                                                          
6 Serhiy Melnichuk in his interview to Reuters on July 29, 2015. See Elisabeth Piper, 
“Special Report: Ukraine struggles to control maverick battalions,” Reuters, July 29, 2015.  
7 Author’s interview with a member of “Dnipro-1” battalion, Kiev, July 14, 2015 
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instance, the leader of “Donbas” battalion, Semen Semenchenko, was elected in the 2014 
Parliamentary Elections as an MP (second on the party list) for Samopomosch Party. Serhiy 
Melnichuk, the former commander of “Aidar” Battalion was also an MP (third on the party 
list) of the oppositional Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko until he was excluded from the 
party in 2015. Andriy Biletsky – the leader and founder of “Azov” Battalion – is an 
independent MP representing in Verkhovnaia Rada, one of the districts of the capital city 
Kiev. The “Azov” Battalion is also under the direct patronage of Oleh Lyashko, the leader 
of the Radical Party. Dmytro Yarosh, the Commander of the far-right “Right Sector” 
battalion is an MP for his own party. Unlike all of the above paramilitary commanders, 
who are in opposition to the governing coalition, the Commander of “Dnipro-1”, Yury 
Bereza, was elected as an MP for the governing People’s Front party (10th on the list). 
Despite Bereza’s association with Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk’s party, political 
affiliations of the most powerful leaders of paramilitaries suggest that their loyalty to 
Poroshenko’s government is, at least, nominal. 
Direct representation in Ukraine’s executive branch ensured volunteer battalions’ 
legitimacy and legal protection. From the first moments of their inception, volontery were 
given the legal status of “territorial self-defence units” and were subordinated either to the 
Ministry of Interior (as parts of National Guard) or the Ministry of Defence (as defence 
battalions). Nonetheless, the emergence and rise of volontery occurred in a complete legal 
chaos. While Donbas and Azov battalions were legally incorporated into the National 
Guard, “Dnipro-1,” “Aidar” and “Shakhtar” allegedly remained under the jurisdiction of 
the Ministry of Defence as “territorial defence” or “special purpose” battalions in 
accordance with the Presidential decree of September 02nd 2013 regarding “the approval 
of territorial defence of Ukraine”. Others, such as the “Right Sector” and another ultra-
nationalist group – the “OUN Battalion” – remained in a legal vacuum until mid-2015 
when following an announcement from the Ministry of Defence (Gordon, 2015), the “Right 
Sector” was “integrated” into the armed forces. 
Given the weakness of Ukraine’s army and its inability to perform 
counterinsurgency tasks – most of which are currently being conducted by volunteer 
battalions – volontery are confident in their superiority. Despite the official claims that all 
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volontery are under the direct control of ATO’s command,8 the evidence shows that 
paramilitary battalions obey Kiev’s orders as long as they are aligned with the battalions’ 
goals and objectives, such as the standoff between the members of the “Azov” Battalion 
and the government troops, which occurred in April 2015 near the village of Shirokino in 
the district of Mariupol, when “Azov” fighters refused to leave the village and, with relative 
ease, were able to impose their will on the army command. In his interview to Kyiv Post, 
Semenchenko hinted that after war in the East was over, volontery might have to take fight 
to Kiev’s government offices in order to “weed out” corrupt politicians.9 The fact that 
volontery battalions are not directly accountable to anyone but their immediate leaders is 
well known and understood in Kiev.10 For example, in March 2015, fighters of 
Kolomoisky’s “Dnipro-1” Battalion were ordered by the oligarch to block offices of the 
UkrTransNafta bank after the bank’s CEO – Kolomoisky’s associate – had been removed 
from his job (Balmforth, 2015). This move was described by Kolomoisky as a necessity to 
protect the company’s facilities from “Russian saboteurs.” 
Threats of military coup – in case the officials in Kiev either agree on the special 
status of Donbas region or cede occupied territories – have been reiterated not only by the 
leadership of the right-wing “Right Sector” Battalion, but also by more moderate 
commanders of “Donbas” battalion. Concerns by government officials over serious threats 
posed by members of volontery had been voiced by Elena Yakhno, the Spokeswoman for 
Kiev’s Prosecutor General, who quoted the Prosecutor General commenting the following 
about the fighters of the “Aidar” Battalion who staged a protest in Kiev in November 2014: 
“… it is one thing when they protect the state in the East and it is another thing when they 
appear in cities with their weapons. Particularly in the capital, I consider it an internal threat 
… they can’t be ignored, they can easily attempt to overthrow the government.” In early 
July 2015, verbal confrontations between paramilitary leaders and Kiev officials escalated 
                                                          
8Interview of Ukraine’s Minister of Defence, Stepan Poltorak, with the German newspaper 
Die Zeit in August 2015. 
9 Semen Semenchenko’s interview to Kyiv Post on August 24, 2014. 
10 Author’s interview with an official at the Ukraine’s Ministry of Interior, Kiev, July 12, 
2015.  
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into a shootout between security forces and the “Right Sector” fighters in the town of 
Mukachevo. At a massive rally attended by several thousand protesters that was organised 
by the “Right Sector” in the centre of Kiev, following the violent incident, paramilitary 
commanders openly announced their readiness to “change” the regime unless it took a 
tougher stand on the issue of the occupied territories in the Donbas region and tackled the 
corruption. The “Right Sector’s” capacity to stage audacious mass rallies in its support in 
the capital and other big cities, as well as other battalions’ ability to move their armed 
fighters freely around the capital and threaten the government as they see it fit is not only 
derived from the political legitimacy of volunteer battalions but is also engendered in 
widespread popular support that these groups enjoy.  
 
People’s Army: Popular Support  
 
Volontery’s pivotal role in standing up to Russian aggression and in successfully 
halting separatist military advances in the East – particularly after the failure of Ukrainian 
security forces to achieve either of these tasks – has earned them broad popular support 
and recognition. A representative survey, conducted by the Kiev International Institute of 
Sociology in December 2014, revealed that over 30% (over 50% in the West and 19% in 
the East of the country) of the Ukrainian public thought that volunteer battalions are the 
“military-patriotic elite.” Another 25% believed that volontery will serve as a background 
for reforming the Army and security services. A smaller percentage of respondents (16%) 
were concerned that volontery are “private armies” of oligarchs and only 10% said that 
volontery pose a threat to the government and can potentially stage a coup d’état. The same 
survey has captured markedly high levels of popular trust towards the volontery: out of 
maximum of 10 points of trust, every fourth respondent gave volunteer battalions 7.3 points 
(the highest among all other institutions on the list). These figures sharply contract popular 
trust towards the government, which only scored 4.5 points, and towards the official 
security services which received 3.8 points (Ukraine Today, 2014).  
Instead of creating an image of brutal counterinsurgents, typical to self-defence 
paramilitaries, volunteer battalions have struggled hard to present themselves as a 
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“people’s army” that fights a “people’s war.”11 Juxtaposing themselves to the government, 
which is increasingly seen as corrupt and “infested” by oligarchs, volunteer battalions, 
despite their fairly open association with those political forces which they accuse of 
corruption and nepotism, seek to create an image of grassroots popular movements. 
Volontery’s virtually unchallenged monopoly on the use of violence and their ability to 
confront the regime are further enhanced by their relative financial independence from the 
State. While a share of volunteer battalions’ funding is siphoned off by Ukraine’s oligarchs 
and other elites with political interests, a significant portion of paramilitaries’ funding is 
derived from private donations made by the public. Extensive fundraising campaigns for 
volunteer battalions are implemented through both social media where volontery are 
vocally represented and door-to-door campaigns.12   
Given the fact that the Ukrainian State, which is strapped for cash and severely 
crippled by the economic crisis, is unable to equip and supply official armed forces, private 
support constitutes a vital source of funding not only for volunteer units but also for the 
Army. As detailed by a member of Ukraine’s regular armed forces, his family had to spend 
over US$2000 to purchase uniform and body armour, none of which had been provided by 
the Army, which only issued him an old Kalashnikov assault rifle (Luhn, 2015). In the 
words of Alexander Glyadelov (Hyde, 2014), a Ukrainian journalist embedded with the 
“Donbas” battalion, “[t]he government is only providing weapons and even those not to 
everyone, and not of the best quality.” In light of this, the role of private donations and 
non-combat volunteers offering assistance with supply, logistics, technical maintenance, 
medical aid and many other issues remains crucial for the survival of volunteer battalions.13 
In order to maintain the image of “people’s army,” volontery have shunned 
involvement in criminal activities and sought to counter accusations that some of their 
members were convicted criminals (Zhurnal Zhytomira, 2015). For example, the leader of 
“Azov” Battalion, Biletsky, describes his previous conviction for an armed assault as 
                                                          
11 Author’s interview with a civil society representative at the “Reanimation Package of 
Reforms”, Kiev, July 18, 2015.   
12 Author’s interview with a Ukrainian journalist, Kiev, July 25, 2015.   
13 Author’s interview with a former member of “Donbas” battalion, Kiev, July 18, 2015.  
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politically motivated (Bereza, 2014). Regardless of several attempts to refine their popular 
image, accusations of human rights violations and war crimes committed by volunteer 
battalions were plentiful. Among others, “Aidar” has come under the harshest criticism 
from the Amnesty International for alleged war crimes, which included torture, theft, extra-
judicial executions and rape (Amnesty International, 2014). In June 2015, in an 
unprecedented move to address international accusations, the Verkhovnaia Rada stripped 
the former leader of “Aidar” Battalion, Melnichuk, of parliamentary immunity from 
prosecution, accusing him and other members of the battalion of raiding private businesses 
in the region of Lugansk. As of August 2015, the case against Melnichuk has not proceeded 
any further and no arrest warrant has ever been issued. Bearing in mind that Melnichyk left 
the battalion in early 2015 and had been replaced in February by Yevhen Ptashnyk as the 
battalion’s Commander, his prosecution – provided that it ever occurs – would hardly affect 
the battalion’s public image. Unable to challenge such powerful volunteer battalions as 
“Donbas” or “Azov,” the government, however, sought to weed out less significant rogue 
elements of the paramilitary cohort. In September 2014, an unnamed volunteer battalion 
has been disbanded by the Ministry of Interior for engaging in what the Minister of Interior, 
Arsen Avakov, described as “plunder and the violation of discipline” (Liga Novosti, 2014). 
All of the above, however, did not seem to affect either the popular support for 
volontery or their position vis-à-vis the government. As the bulk of war crimes and human 
rights violations cases raised against the volontery were allegedly committed in rebel-
controlled eastern regions of the country, these rogue behaviours of paramilitaries were 
simply perceived as part of the “necessary evil.”14 Instead, Kiev’s efforts to reign in 
volunteer battalions are seen by the latter as a sign of fear on part of corrupt government 
officials, who in the words of the “Right Sector’s” Commander, Dmytro Yarosh, “will soon 
be cleared off their offices.”15 Since statements of this nature are increasingly popular 
among the broader public, unhappy with the slow pace of reforms and the failure of post-
Euromaidan government to follow on with its promises, the paramilitaries’ legitimacy vis-
à-vis the State remains solid.    
                                                          
14 Author’s interviews with representatives of civil society, Kiev, July 15-24, 2015. 





This article suggested that state-parallel militias is a relatively under-researched type 
of paramilitaries that differs from state-manipulated paramilitaries. In contrast to state-
controlled militias, state-parallel paramilitaries have superior military strength which the 
state needs to ensure its survival. These organisations function, at least on paper, within 
legal frameworks and have strong political representation, sustained not only through 
obscure links with the country’s financial and political elites, but also via direct 
representation by elected and appointed officials. They also enjoy popular support and 
broad recognition among the population, even though both the former and the latter might 
be limited to representations of titular ethnic or sectarian groups. Despite their apparent 
embeddedness into the state’s structures, these organisations are fiercely independent from 
the state. They also have their own sources of funding. All of the above enables 
paramilitaries to act and function parallel to government. The weakness of the state and the 
presence of strong armed opposition to the state, such as a rebel movement, are essential 
for the emergence and rise to prominence of state-parallel paramilitaries, who might thrive 
only under the combination of these two factors. It is worth noting that, just as in the case 
with state-manipulated groups, lumping all state-parallel paramilitaries into one monolithic 
category is erroneous and it must be emphasised that the degree of these organisations’ 
military superiority vis-à-vis the state or their political representation may differ from one 
case to another. Nevertheless, a combination of military strength, political representation 
and popular support has played a prominent part in each case of state-parallel 
paramilitaries’ appearance. 
The emergence of Ukraine’s volunteer battalions, discussed here as an example of 
an state-parallel paramilitary organisation, provides empirical insights into inherent 
organisational, operational and functional differences between this type of paramilitaries 
and their contemporaries, described here under the term state-manipulated militias. With 
their primary purpose of protecting the state from the military superiority of insurgents, 
rather than being created to perform state’s “dirty jobs,” Ukraine’s volontery had 
effectively substituted the army during the summer of 2014 government’s offensive on pro-
 25 
Russian separatists functioning as a primary counterinsurgent. Their emergence, despite 
legally sanctioned by the state, began beyond the state’s control and with its limited 
assistance or interference. Self-appointed leaders of volunteer battalions skilfully 
manoeuvred through Ukraine’s political sphere, allying themselves with oligarchs and 
opposition parties and eventually becoming democratically elected to the Parliament.  
These findings offer a number of policy implications for international community. 
Firstly, due to state-parallel militias’ higher capacity to engage in violence, their presence 
in conflict zones might be expected to escalate conflicts and to complicate peace-making 
efforts. Unlike state-manipulated paramilitaries, which commonly seek to remain outside 
of state structures, state-parallel militias are keen to present their organisations as key 
conflict stakeholders. Secondly, the emergence of state-parallel paramilitaries is to be 
expected in situations of state weakness and the presence of armed conflict. Efforts by the 
international community to alleviate state failure and to prevent escalation of civil wars 
might prevent the mobilisation of paramilitaries in the midst of conflict. Lastly, the 
existence of powerful state-parallel groups presents further challenges to state-building. 
Governments with an experience of relying on state-parallel militias might face difficulties 
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